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A Clash of Capitalisms: 
Foreign Shareholders and Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines the conflict between stakeholder- and market-based business systems that 
resulted from an increase in foreign portfolio investment in the Japanese economy in the 1990’s. As 
foreign institutions, which were more interested in investment returns than in long-term relationships, 
replaced domestic shareholders, one of the fundamental pillars of Japan’s stakeholder capitalism began 
to crack, and Japanese firms began to adopt practices more characteristic of Anglo-American market 
economies. In an analysis of 1626 listed Japanese firms between 1990 and 1997, we found that foreign 
shareholders increased a firm’s propensity to downsize and divest assets. The effect of foreign 
shareholders was strongest among firms less integrated into the existing Japanese system—those with 
lower levels of shareholding by domestic corporations and financial institutions. There is little evidence 
that foreigners exerted pressure directly through shareholder activism. Rather, as firms’ resource 





A Clash of Capitalisms: 
Foreign Shareholders and Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan 
 
The impact of global markets for capital, products, labor and information on national economic 
systems ranks among the most critical issues in the social sciences today. While a long tradition of 
research has predicted an increasing similarity of organizational forms, business practices, and market 
structures in the face of advancing technology and intensifying competitive pressures (Bell, 1973; Kerr, 
Dunlop, et al. 1964; Coffee, 1999), other scholars highlight the improbability of such convergence. They 
argue that a nation’s economic structure is the product of a set of complementary institutions, including 
the state, financial infrastructure, and social system; and consequently, business systems vary widely 
across the globe (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Whitley, 1992; Streeck and 
Yamamura, 2001).  Research on regional and national economies demonstrates that decades of global 
trade, multinational corporations, and rapidly flowing information has done little to suppress the rich 
diversity of business systems across continents (Guillen, 2001; Berger and Dore, 1996). 
One of the sharpest distinctions among business systems is between the market economies of 
the Anglo-American countries, and the stakeholder economies, as typified by Germany and Japan  (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Albert, 1993; Streeck and Yamamura, 2001). At the core of this distinction are 
different systems of corporate finance and corporate ownership. The Anglo-American system is based 
on dispersed shareholders and equity-based finance. In contrast, stakeholder business systems feature 
debt financing, concentrated shareholders, and tight interconnected networks between firms, their 
trading partners and financial institutions. These different financial systems are closely linked to 
differences in employment policies and firm strategies. The Anglo-American system features highly liquid 
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labor markets, an external market for skills, and an emphasis on profitability over growth, while 
stakeholder systems are built around internal labor markets, development of firm-specific skills, and an 
emphasis on growth over profits. 
Japanese and German performance in the postwar economy demonstrated that stakeholder 
business systems had distinct advantages: in promoting growth, developing skills, and refining 
manufacturing processes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Some writers even advocated that the US and the 
UK adopt stakeholder systems (Albert, 1993; Dore, 1987).  In the early 1990’s, however, increasing 
globalization of capital began to undermine the very foundations of the stakeholder systems of business. 
Institutional investors, especially those from the Anglo-American economies, increasingly looked 
beyond their own national borders for investment opportunities (Useem, 1998). Between 1990 and 
1998, Americans increased their holdings of foreign shares from $197.3 million to $1.4 trillion 
(Steinmetz and Sesit, 1999) and much of this went to non Anglo-American economies. During this 
period, for example, foreign ownership in Japanese stocks increased from 4 to 10% of all publicly listed 
shares. Foreign ownership continued to increase to levels of around 20% by 2001 (Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, 2001).  Concurrently, the strong banking systems that supported the stakeholder systems 
declined. Large firms increasingly moved from bank debt to capital markets. In Japan, a banking crisis 
weakened the banks, and caused them to sell off large portions of their holdings of firm shares (Hoshi 
and Kashyap, 2001), while in Germany, leading banks shifted their strategies from relationship banking 
towards investment banking and capital markets. 
This globalization of investment capital brought market and stakeholder-based systems of 
capitalism into direct contact. What was the result of this interaction?  The Economist, a strong 
proponent of market-based capitalism proclaimed the end of stakeholder capitalism: “The [German and 
Japanese] model is itself quietly being dismantled. For as an equity culture has spread in Germany, 
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France and even in Japan and Italy, these countries have been inexorably evolving in an American 
direction” (Economist, 2001). Researchers on business systems, however, have argued that change is 
not so easy.  Business systems consist of a set of closely linked, complementary institutions, and a 
change in one part of the system does not mean wholesale transformation (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Aoki, 2001).  It is difficult, however, to believe that foreign capital has had no influence on change.  
With their growing investments abroad, institutional investors, with no interest other than to maximize 
returns for their investors, increasingly replaced long-term, patient shareholders. Firms with foreign 
shareholders simultaneously confronted two systems of business, and two very different sorts of 
pressure. How did they respond? 
This paper explores this question in a study of 1,626 publicly listed Japanese firms between 
1990 and 1997. We examine the effect of foreign ownership on downsizing and asset divestiture, and 
how existing patterns of ownership, by Japanese financial institutions and corporations, moderated the 
effect of foreign shareholding. Foreign influence did not occur in a vacuum—rather, foreigners 
encountered existing elements of Japan’s stakeholder system. We are thus interested in how the 
interaction between these two systems shaped firm behavior. Japan is a particularly interesting setting for 
research on the confrontation between two business systems for a number of reasons:  the Japanese 
system contrasted so sharply with the Anglo-American system,  the influence of foreign investors 
increased dramatically during the 1990’s, and firm-level data on foreign investment in Japanese firms is 
widely available. Downsizing and asset divestiture are particularly interesting practices to study, as they 
represent the main points of contention between Japanese and Anglo-American systems. In Japan, the 
company was considered a community, with lifetime employment and increasing opportunities for core 
employees a primary objective (Dore, 1973). In the US firm, in contrast, downsizing had become a 
legitimate and effective means to deliver further value to shareholders (Budros, 1997). Similarly 
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Japanese firms valued growth over profitability or share price (Ableggan and Stalk, 1985) while US 
firms in the 1980’s and 1990’s showed increasing willingness to sell off and reconfigure assets to 
improve the return on shareholders’ investments (Davis, Diekmann et al., 1994).   
We argue that foreign investors exerted their influence on Japanese firms due to shifting resource 
dependencies for capital, rather than direct pressure. We demonstrate that firms more dependent on 
foreign capital—those with a larger percentage of foreign shareholders and with a high reliance on 
foreign markets—were more likely to respond to foreign influence through downsizing and asset 
divestiture. Firms more closely integrated into the existing Japanese system through existing banking and 
corporate relationships, as well as through business group membership, were less susceptible to foreign 
influence. Our analyses indicate that globalization of capital is leading to some degree of convergence in 
business practices, though mainly among those firms already less integrated into local business systems.  
 While our research is set in Japan, its implications reach across the study of institutional and 
organizational change in a global economy. Our questions, of how global capital affects firm behavior, 
and what happens when foreign investors bring market-based capitalism to a stakeholder system, have 
important implications for understanding organizations. While organizational theorists have long focused 
on the organizational change, they have tended to focus on domestic pressures. Developing theory and 
gathering empirical evidence on how firms respond to the pressures of global markets—be it for capital, 




Japan’s distinct path of development has been a rejoinder to predictions that economies across 
the world would become more similar in the process of economic development. Decades ago, in one of 
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the first systematic studies of the Japanese corporation, James Abegglen argued strongly against 
convergence, noting   “…industrial organization in Japan has followed a different course from that of the 
United States; yet it has also achieved outstanding results. Indeed, it seems likely that it is as a 
consequence of having developed a different, Japanese approach to organization that Japan has 
accomplished the industrial success that it has” (Abegglen 1969, p. 100).  By the 1980’s, as Japan 
began to overtake other developed economies in a number of industries, widespread agreement had 
emerged:  Japanese economic institutions differed in many respects from those of US and European 
industrialized nations and yet were highly effective.  
Scholars, in a rich outpouring of research, sought to explain the particular historical, political, 
and institutional circumstances leading to the development of the Japanese economic system (see for 
example, Clark, 1979; Cole, 1979; Gordon, 1985; Johnson, 1982; Westney, 1987). They highlighted a 
complementary system of employment practices, industrial organization, corporate ownership and 
finance, and state policy that linked together to form the Japanese system.  Large Japanese firms offered 
a system of “welfare corporatism” (Dore, 1973), combining permanent employment, age-based 
compensation and promotion, and enterprise unionism.  Industrial organization was characterized by 
intercorporate groups of firms linked through long-term, partially exclusive trading relationships and 
capital flows (Gerlach, 1992). Firms developed and implemented strategy based on long-term goals, 
and sought to maximize market share and growth, rather than profits or share price (Abegglen and Stalk, 
1985). 
This Japanese variant of capitalism balanced the interests of multiple stakeholders: employers, 
creditors, trading partners, and finally, shareholders (Clark 1979; Aoki 1988). The fact that they came 
last was of little concern to most shareholders: they had other interests in the firm, and were concerned 
about the broader relationship, rather than their return on investment. In the late 1980’s, banks and 
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other financial institutions held about 40% of Japanese publicly listed shares. While the law forbid any 
single bank from holding a stake of greater than 5%, banks combined with closely affiliated trust banks, 
insurance companies, and other affiliated financial institutions to assure that shares remained in friendly 
hands. Banks made money through corporate lending and fees, rather than share appreciation. Other 
corporations held approximately 25% of shares in the late 1980’s, often in the form of cross-
shareholding. These shareholding stakes often cemented long-term relationships between a firm and its 
buyers, distributors, parts suppliers, and other product and service suppliers. While the stake of a single 
firm was often not high and the concentration of shareholding in Japanese firms was low (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1998), a firm’s shares tended to be held by a number of friendly firms, often 
members of the same business group.  
 The Anglo-American system contrasted sharply with the Japanese system.  Firms relied heavily 
on capital markets rather than on close main bank relationships. Corporate ownership was highly 
dispersed, and the majority of shareholders were institutional or individual investors. Institutional 
ownership increased dramatically during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  In 1985, institutional investors owned 
about 43% of the shares of the 1,000 largest US companies, while individuals owned 57%. By 1997, 
those positions had reversed; institutions owned 60% and individuals only 40% (Useem, 1996). The 
increase in institutional participation was accompanied by an increased in shareholder activism. Investors 
showed their preferences through exit—average share turnover per NYSE listed firm increased from 
12% in 1960, to 46% in 1990 and 94% in 2001 (Byrne, 2002). They also exercised influence through 
voice—publicizing firms that did not meet their expectations, meeting with CEO’s, and exercising their 
voting rights. An active hostile takeover market also made it easier to depose managers who strayed too 
far from the interests of shareholders. While the takeover market had virtually disappeared by the end of 
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the 1980’s, by the time it was over, more than a third of the companies in the Fortune 500 at the 
beginning of the decade had ceased to exist as independent entities (Davis and Stout, 1992).  
By the 1990s, it was universally accepted by US managers that the fundamental purpose of the 
corporation was to “create shareholder value.” For US firms, that has translated into a set of practices, 
such as break up of conglomerates and the pursuit of “focus” (cf. Davis and Robbins 2002). 
Downsizing in the 1980’s increased, as a means to refocus firms and increase responsibility to 
shareholders (Budros, 1997). As documented by Useem (1996), the system of governance now in 
place in the US can be described as “investor capitalism.” Though there is occasional lip service paid to 
the need to consider and weigh the interests of all the various stakeholders of the firm,  “the range of 
constituencies that matter has been narrowed to only one” (Davis and Robbins, 2002). 
 
Investor capitalism moves abroad   
In the 1990’s, institutional investors increasingly added international stocks to their portfolios. 
Fresh from their victories in the US, these investors brought their calls for investor capitalism around the 
world (Useem 1998; Steinmetz, 1999). CalPERS (California Public Employees Retirement System), 
one of the most active and vocal institutional investors, called for economies around the world to adopt 
practices more consistent with US investor capitalism. For example, CalPERS’ recommendations for 
Japan called for an increased focus on shareholders:  
 
“Best governance practices in Japan should include elements that strengthen management 
accountability to corporate owners through the director-shareholder relationship…In order to 
attract new investors, particularly from overseas, Japanese corporations will need to 
demonstrate that corporate assets are being managed in the interests of the company and its 
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owners, not in the interests of a select group of shareholders or stakeholders. Improvements in 
corporate governance which increase the emphasis on long-term returns to shareholders will 
increase the marketability and attractiveness of a company’s shares and, by increasing share 
value, will benefit inside shareholders as well as outsiders” 
(calpersgovernance.org/principles/international/japan/page03 9/22/99).  
 
For CalPERS, the term “corporate owners” clearly meant shareholders. And the notion that 
shareholders were a firm’s owners represented a sharp break from Japan’s stakeholder system. In the 
Japanese system, the “marketability and attractiveness of a company’s shares” was of secondary 
interest. The entrance of CalPERS and other foreign institutional investors set the stage for a clash 
between systems.  
Of course, making pronouncements about shareholder value and actually influencing firms to 
make a difference are two different things. Institutional investors such as CalPERS, however, had a 
number of ways to make a difference. First, foreign investors had an inordinate influence on share prices 
during this period. Foreign shareholders were much more active in buying and selling shares than 
Japanese investors (except the banks, which were net sellers). And, according to an IR manager for a 
major company, Japanese investors often followed foreigners’ moves in and out of stocks (interview, 
7/2000). While share price was not a main focus of attention for Japanese managers during much of the 
post-war period, share price was gaining increasing attention. Equity linked finance had become 
increasingly important during the 1980’s, as firms increasingly turned to equity linked convertible bonds 
and bonds with warrants. While equity financing decreased during the early 1990s, it began to increase 
again in 1996, 1997, and 1998 (Hoshi and Kashyap: p. 240). In the mid-1990s, Japanese managers 
did not expect to remain mired in an ongoing regression—in 1995-1996, economic prospects had been 
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looking better. Thus, it is plausible that executives expected to continue to use equity finance in the 
future, and increasingly, kept an eye on share price. 
Japanese managers were also concerned about hostile takeovers. This threat was not an 
immediate one—hostile takeovers in Japan were rare during this period, and remain rare even today. 
Nevertheless, there was concern that Japanese firms would soon find themselves on the receiving end of 
a hostile takeover bid. In the second half of the 1990s, for example, Toyota began to increase its equity 
stakes in affiliated suppliers, a move, it claimed, designed to keep their shares out of the hands of 
foreigners (Shirouzu, 1999). The head of investor relations at Sony said that concern for hostile 
takeover led it on a program of restructuring and reform in its organizational structure and corporate 
governance. Sony, he said, was concerned about its relatively low market capitalization. A low share 
price, combined with a high level of foreign investors (which at Sony hovered near 50%), was a volatile 
combination (speech at American Chamber of Commerce, December 2001). Sony and other 
companies feared that in the event of a tender offer, foreigners would sell to the highest bidder, unlike 
stable and friendly Japanese financial institutions and corporations.  
While there was no active shareholder movement in the 1990s, foreigners also exercised 
influence through voice. Japanese firms initiated investor relations activities directed towards foreigners 
(investor relations for domestic investors began somewhat later). Senior Japanese managers began to 
meet with the big U.S. funds, and learned of their concerns first hand. A former executive in a foreign 
investment firm noted that Japanese managers became more aware of what foreigners wanted.  “When 
they see foreign ownership on their share register moving from 5% to 10% to 20%, they feel a strong 
psychological pressure to pay attention to corporate governance (interview 6/2002).”  To these 
managers, corporate governance implied Anglo-American practices, such as downsizing, and other 
types of restructuring. In our own interviews with Japanese executives, we also found that executives 
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were extremely aware of how much of their shares were owned by foreigners.1 While they insisted that 
foreigners had done little to exert direct pressure on them, they admitted that they were increasingly 
making decisions with foreigners in mind.  
Foreign ownership also gave firms a justification for taking measures that were distasteful and 
likely to be criticized. The best-known example of this function of foreigners was the takeover of Nissan 
by Renault in 1999. Nissan, under the leadership of Carlos Ghosn, a Renault executive, proceeded with 
downsizing, selling off of related businesses, and severing contacts with long-term suppliers. Both 
people inside Nissan and in the Japanese business community noted that only a foreigner could have 
done this, and such behavior would not have been accepted from Japanese managers, unless they were 
under severe foreign pressure. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 The objective of this paper is to examine the degree to which foreign institutional investors 
caused Japanese firms to adopt practices consistent with Anglo-American investor capitalism, and to 
assess the degree to which foreign influence was tempered by domestic institutions, of institutional and 
corporate shareholding, and business groups. One challenge in studying the effect of foreign investors is 
that, as research on corporate governance in the US has revealed, firms adopt all sorts of strategies to 
conform to shareholder demands in appearance, but not in substance (Westphal and Zajac, 1998). In 
this paper, we examine two practices that are substantial rather than symbolic: downsizing, as measured 
                                                 
1 One of the authors conducted interviews with approximately 50 corporate executives, institutional 
investors, and government officials involved in the Japanese market, between 2000 and 2002. This was 
part of a larger project on corporate governance reform and changes in the Japanese business system.  
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by reduction of total number of permanent employees, and divestiture of assets, as measured by 
reduction of fixed assets.  
It is difficult to think of a management practice less consistent with Japanese social norms than 
downsizing. Stable long-term employment within large firms was a core element of Japanese economic 
and political policy for decades. In contrast, the 1980s saw an enormous wave of downsizing among 
US firms. While employment reductions in response to extremely bad performance had previously been 
common, it was novel for reasonably profitable firms to downsize in the pursuit of increased profits. It 
was an indication of the growing ascendance of shareholders over stakeholders that the pursuit of 
“increased shareholder value” was accepted as a legitimate justification for downsizing (Budros, 1997). 
Yet by the 1990s, it was clear that such strategic downsizing was an established an accepted part of 
normal corporate strategy (Useem, 1996). 
 The divestiture of assets is another form of restructuring that was a centerpiece of shareholder 
activism. In the United States, the emphasis of shareholder activism has been on strategic focus on 
spinning off unrelated diversified divisions (Davis and Robbins, 2002). Since Japanese firms were more 
focused, and had long spun off unrelated, or marginally related operations (Ito, 1995), the pertinent 
problem was excess assets in the form of overcapacity or real estate. Yet after years of gauging their 
progress in terms of corporate growth, it was difficult for Japanese management to divest productive 
assets “merely” because they were under-performing. A manager at a large Japanese firm that had been 
recently taken over by a US company recounted to one of the authors an example of this sort of 
discipline. This firm had owned a hotel in a very valuable tourist spot, and though it was not losing 
money, neither was it producing large profits for the firm. One of the first acts of the US management 
was to sell the hotel. The manager claimed that the idea of divesting this asset had not occurred to the 
Japanese management, and if it had, would probably not have been considered seriously. 
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Firms with foreign shareholders were more likely to downsize and divest assets for several 
reasons. First, downsizing and selling off under-performing assets were consistent with the ideology of 
investor capitalism and signaled effective management to foreign shareholders. Second, downsizing and 
asset divestiture were moves to increase operating efficiency and ensure proper levels of return to a 
firm’s equity investors. Japanese firms suffered from excess employees—after a bout of over-hiring 
during the bubble economy in the late 1980’s. Estimates of excess employees reached six million 
(Eisenstodt, 1995). During these over-heated bubble years, Japanese firms had also over-invested in 
real estate and production capacity. This exacerbated already low levels of productivity across many 
industries. For example, McKinsey & Co. estimated that productivity of capital in Japan, across all 
industries, was 60% of that in the US, while labor productivity was about 70% (McKinsey, 2000).  
We predict that the higher the levels of foreign ownership a firm has, the more likely it will take 
action to become leaner, by downsizing or divesting assets.  
 
H1: The greater the percentage of a firm’s shares held by foreign investors, the more likely it is to 
downsize or divest assets.  
 
In Japan, there was a distinct difference between wholly domestic and export-oriented firms. 
Export oriented-firms must compete on a global basis, and were less likely than domestic firms to be 
protected by a cocoon of regulations. Export oriented firms also had considerable infrastructure 
overseas—sales offices, and, increasingly, manufacturing facilities. These firms were likely to be looking 
to foreigners for capital to support their day-to-day operations as well as their capital investments. They 
were also likely to be pursuing acquisition and joint-venture strategies with domestic partners.  Thus, 
export-oriented firms were particularly concerned about the good will of foreign investors. Toyota, for 
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example, in 1999 announced that it would list on the NYSE and London Stock Exchanges, as a means 
not only to increase its exposure to foreign capital, but also to improve its image and name recognition 
among foreign investors (Nikkei, 1999). Exporting firms were thus particularly dependent on foreign 
capital, and with their global exposure, are more likely to be aware of demands of foreign investors. 
Consequently,  
 
H2: The more a firm exports, the stronger the relationship between foreign ownership and downsizing 
and asset divestiture.  
 
Foreign investors, however, came face to face with an existing set of institutions. The Japanese 
economy in the 1990’s experienced a slow stagnation, rather than collapse, and therefore existing 
institutions remained intact. The banking system, though weakened, remained one of the cornerstones of 
Japan’s stakeholder economy. Although the law limited a single bank’s holdings to no more than 5% of 
a firm’s shares, the combination of banks, affiliated trust banks, insurance companies, and other 
concerns concentrated a considerable percentage of shares in the hands of financial institutions.  A bank 
made most of its money through loans and various banking fees, and held shares to manage its overall 
relationship with a firm, rather than for dividends (which were miniscule in Japan) or for appreciation 
(since stakes were rarely sold). Consequently, the bank’s overall interest lay in preventing defaults, and 
fostering stable growth so that a firm repaid its loans and continued to borrow in the future. Banks 
protected their interests through careful monitoring of firms, and, if a firm was in distress, mounted a 
bailout by providing managerial and financial resources, and orchestrating the rescue efforts of other 
shareholders (Kester, 1991). 
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Firms with high equity holdings by financial institutions were less susceptible to the influence of 
foreign shareholders for several reasons.  First, firms with high levels of equity holdings by banks had 
better access to financing and were assured of a lender of last resort. Researchers have demonstrated 
that firms with close relationships to main banks recovered more quickly from financial crisis, as main 
banks were more willing to provide them with liquidity (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). Financial 
shareholders were also less likely to sell their shares in the case of a takeover bid or other crisis, and 
thus made a firm less susceptible to the fickle nature of foreigner investors.  A good example of the 
value of stable shareholders was seen in 2002, when Yoshiaki Murakami, manager of an activist 
investment fund (Japan’s only activist domestic fund), purchased an 11.9% stake in a medium-sized 
clothing firm, Tokyo Style. Tokyo Style had a cushion of cash larger than its market capitalization, sitting 
in bank deposits.  Murakami demanded that the firm pay its investors a 500 yen dividend, buy back its 
shares, and appoint two Murakami-endorsed outside directors. The proposal was defeated, barely, as 
friendly banks and affiliated companies came to Tokyo Style’s aid, while foreign investors supported 
Murakami’s demands (Singer, 2002).  We predict that a firm with a large percentage of ownership by 
financial institutions will be less susceptible to foreign influence. 
 
H3: The greater the percentage of a firm’s shares held by financial institutions, the weaker the 
relationship between foreign ownership and downsizing and asset divestiture. 
 
Shareholdings by related corporations also provided an important base for the Japanese system 
of capitalism, though there is some debate as to the exact role of these shares. Some scholars argue that 
they were a means to prevent hostile takeovers while others assert that they were a means to monitor 
and govern interfirm transactions (Kester, 1991; Flath, 1996; Gilson and Roe, 1993). Still others argue 
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that their role was largely symbolic, and that they signified particularly close and long-term business 
relationships (Gerlach, 1992). Whatever the exact function of corporate shareholding, it was not to 
maximize return on investment, but rather, to manage long-term commitments. 
 As the Tokyo Style case indicates, corporate shareholders also enabled a firm to resist the 
demands of foreigners. Firms with corporate shareholders had a strong core of stable shareholders who 
would hold their shares, even as the foreigners threatened to sell, thus protecting a firm from takeover.  
Corporate shareholders also helped firms with access to financing, either through management of 
accounts payable and receivable (see Hodder and Tschoegl, 1985) or through directly intervening with 
banks. Corporate shareholders also offered assurance of long-term, stable transactions, and assistance 
if a firm encountered financial crisis, in order to preserve ongoing business relations. Thus, 
 
H4: The greater the percentage of a firm’s shares held by other corporations, the weaker the 
relationship between foreign ownership and downsizing and asset divestiture. 
 
Japanese firms were also embedded in networks of business groups (Gerlach, 1992). There 
were, in very broad terms, two types of corporate group: intermarket groups, or kigyo shudan, 
comprised of large firms in diverse industries and vertical groups, of manufacturers and their affiliated 
suppliers and distributors. Dense webs of equity, bank loans, interlocking directorates, joint projects 
and other social and business relationships linked group members. These corporate groups valued 
stable performance and ongoing relationships at the expense of superior financial gains (Lincoln, Gerlach, 
et al., 1996; Nakatani, 1984). A member of a business group was likely to have a large percentage of 
its shares in the hands of friendly financial institutions and other group corporations, and thus, was even 
more able to resist the pressures of foreigners.  
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H5: The relationship between foreign ownership and downsizing and asset divestiture will be weaker in 
companies that are members of business groups.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The data set consists of 1,626 publicly listed companies in 1990-1997: machinery; electric and 
electronic equipment; shipbuilding and repairing; motor vehicles and auto parts; precision equipment; 
construction; wholesale trade; retail trade; foods; textile products; pulp and paper; chemicals; drugs; 
petroleum; rubber products; stone clay, and glass products; iron and steel; and non-ferrous metal and 
metal products. We included only firms that were publicly listed in all years of this period, omitting 32 
firms that were listed in 1990 but subsequently exited from the sample. Exits were almost all due to 
merger or acquisition or delisting rather than bankruptcy. Since only a very small percentage of the firms 
in the sample exited during this period, selection bias is unlikely to be a problem. We also eliminated 
from the sample 12 firms in which a single foreign corporation had a controlling stake (no firms had 
controlling stakes by institutional investors). In firms that are controlled by foreigners, these foreign 
owners are able to impose their will directly. Since the foreign owner has the last word, the interaction 
between financial and corporate shareholders and foreign shareholders is likely to be irrelevant.  (We 
estimated our models on the full sample as well, and found that including these foreign-controlled 
companies had virtually no effect on the outcomes of interest.) 
 
Dependent variables  
We analyzed two measures of downsizing. The first is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 when a firm 
decreased its number of permanent employees by 5% or more between year t and year t-1. Five 
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percent represents a substantial cut in the labor force, and is large enough to be more than a random 
fluctuation in employment level. The second measure of downsizing is equal to 1 when a firm decreased 
its number of permanent employees by 10% or more between year t and year t-1. A firm may reduce 
employees through early retirement, reduction in hiring, outplacement or firing. Although our data do not 
distinguish between types of employment reduction, it is safe to say that outright firings are relatively 
infrequent. Japanese firms are far less likely than U.S. firms to use firing as a means of labor force 
reduction (Mroczkowski and Hanaoka, 1997). Although firing was not a common technique of 
downsizing, our measure of downsizing represents substantial changes in the number of permanent 
employees (see Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001 and Colignon and Usui, 1996, for discussions of 
methods of downsizing during the 1990s). Our measure of downsizing captures actual labor force 
reductions, not announcements of intentions to downsize. Although researchers on downsizing in the 
United States and Japan have used reports of downsizing events from the mass media (Lee 1997; 
Budros, 1997) public announcements of downsizing in Japan do not necessarily capture actual 
downsizings. A firm may announce downsizing and not go through with it, or try to keep a low profile 
and downsize without an announcement. We believe real reductions in labor force are better measures 
of downsizings than public announcements.  
We measured asset divestiture in a similar way. The first measure is a dichotomous variable that 
equals 1 when a firm decreased its total tangible fixed assets by 5% or more between year t and year t-
1. The second measure equals 1 when a firm decreased its total tangible fixed capital by 10% or more 
between year t and year t-1.  
 
Independent variables  
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Foreign ownership is the percentage of total shares outstanding held by non-Japanese investors. The 
Nikkei NEEDS tape did not specify whether a foreign investor was an individual, an institutional 
investor, or a non-financial corporation. Nikkei Kaisha Nenkan, a printed compilation of corporate 
financial information does report the identities of the top ten shareholders. We examined these reports 
and found that foreign investors are mostly institutional investors. As noted previously, foreign 
corporations had controlling stakes in 12 firms and there were relatively few firms in which foreign 
corporations held top 10 ownership positions. We found that most of the foreign institutional investors 
were from Anglo-American economies (largely from the U.S. and the U.K.). To test whether the effect 
of foreign ownership is stronger among firms with high exports, we included the ratio of exports to 
sales.  
 Financial ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by Japanese banks, trust 
banks, and life and casualty insurance companies. Corporate ownership is the percentage of total 
shares outstanding held by other corporations. The omitted category of share ownership is 
predominantly ownership by individuals. In the 1990s, individuals were an important group of 
shareholders, holding approximately one third of all shares.  Big six group membership takes the value 
of 1 when a firm was a member of the presidents’ council of either the Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Fuyo, Sanwa, or DKB groups (Gerlach, 1992). 
 We measured corporate performance in three ways. Return on assets, profits before taxes and 
extraordinary items divided by total assets, has been used to measure corporate performance in 
numerous analyses of Japanese firm performance (see Kaplan, 1994; Lincoln et al., 1996; Nakatani, 
1984). Since Japanese managers also valued growth as an important corporate objective and 
performance metric (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985), we included annual change in sales between year t 
and year t-1. Since repeated negative profitability is a particularly strong signal of poor performance to 
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Japanese managers, we also included a dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm experienced two 
consecutive periods of negative profitability.  
 
Controls  
To control for industry effects, we included the industry average for each dependent variable. These 
industry averages were calculated by taking the mean of the dependent variable across all firms in the 
same industry, excluding the focal firm, for a given year.  We controlled for firm size with the log 
employees in the case of downsizing, and log of total assets in the case of asset divestiture. In analyses 
of downsizing, we controlled for wage level, calculated by dividing total wages by number of employees, 
standardized by industry. In analyses of divestiture, we controlled for capital intensity, calculated by 
dividing tangible fixed assets by employees.  
 
Analytical approach   
Our data set consisted of a panel of 1,626 firms observed over eight years. Downsizing is an event that 
may or may not occur in any given year and may occur in multiple years. We employed discrete-time 
event history methodology (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). We used a logit model to estimate the 
hazard of a downsizing event in a given year in a pooled sample of each organization observed during 
each of the eight years. The discrete-time model is appropriate when information on the exact timing of 
an event is not available, and multiple organizations report the same event as occurring at the same time 
(i.e., in the same year). In most cases, discrete and continuous time models produce similar results 
(Allison, 1984). It is also important to control for unobserved heterogeneity between firms because 
downsizing was a repeated event. Some firms downsized more than others, and if these different 
propensities to downsize were due to unmeasured firm-specific factors, statistical tests of resulting 
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coefficient estimates could be inaccurate. Following the recommendation of Allison (1984), we included 
a variable that measures each firm’s cumulative history of downsizing since 1985. We also report 
standard errors derived from a robust estimator of variance (White, 1980). This estimator allowed us to 
obtain consistent standard errors even when the correlation structure assumed by a logit model is 
violated. Using this estimator allows us to relax the assumption that observations within the same cluster 
(in our case, the same firm observed across the eight years) are uncorrelated. 
 
FINDINGS 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 2 reports bivariate correlations. 
Figure 1 shows downsizing rates over time, and Figure 2 shows rates of asset divestiture over time. 
Table 3 reports discrete event time series analyses for 5% or greater downsizings. Model 1 is a 
baseline model, including firm characteristics, industry downsizing rates, and previous firm experience in 
downsizing. This model indicates that downsizing became more prevalent over time, varied significantly 
by industry, and was positively related to a firm’s past experience in downsizing. Less profitable and 
slower-growing firms were more likely to downsize, while older firms and firms with higher levels of 
exports were less likely to do so.  
Model 2 adds percentage of foreign ownership. Consistent with H1, the more foreign 
ownership, the more likely a firm was to downsize. Model 3 adds an interaction term between 
percentage foreign ownership and exports. Supporting H2, exporting firms were more susceptible to 
foreign influence in downsizing. 
 Model 4 adds measures of a firm’s integration into the existing Japanese system: financial 
ownership, corporate ownership, and membership in a big six corporate group. Financial and corporate 
ownership had no effect on a firm’s propensity to downsize, while members of big six corporate groups 
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were more likely to downsize. Model 5 introduces an interaction term between foreign ownership and 
financial ownership. As predicted by H3, the estimate is negative and significant. The higher the financial 
ownership of a firm, the less influence foreign owners had. Figure 3 shows the relationship between 
foreign ownership and downsizing at levels of financial ownership of 10% and 30%. It demonstrates 
how the effect of foreign ownership decreases as financial ownership increases.  
Model 6 adds an interaction between corporate ownership and foreign ownership, and supports 
H4. The more corporate ownership a firm had, the less influential were foreign shareholders. Figure 4 
shows the relationship between foreign ownership and downsizing at levels of 10% and 30% corporate 
ownership. H5 was also supported, as shown in Model 7. Members of big six groups were less 
susceptible to foreign influence in downsizing. Model 8 includes all three interactions, and indicates that 
financial ownership, corporate ownership, and big six group membership had independent effects on 
reducing foreign influence.  
Table 4 presents a similar set of analyses for above 10% downsizings. Foreign ownership had a 
large and significant effect on downsizings of this larger magnitude. While the interaction between foreign 
ownership and exports was positive and generally consistent with the results for over 5% downsizing, it 
was not significant. Financial ownership increased a firm’s propensity to conduct large downsizings, as 
did membership in a big six corporate group.  As in the case of 5% downsizing, financial ownership 
decreased the foreign influence, although the estimate was no longer significant. Corporate ownership 
had a very strong dampening effect on foreign influence, while there was no effect of big six group 
membership.  
 
Table 5 presents results for asset divestitures. Foreign ownership increased a firm’s propensity 
to divest assets, although the significance level was low.  Contrary to H2, foreign ownership was not 
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more influential in exporting firms. Model 5 indicates that consistent with H3, financial ownership 
decreased the influence of foreign ownership on asset divestiture, though significance level was relatively 
low.  Contrary to H4, the sign of the interaction between corporate ownership and asset divestiture was 
positive. Big six group membership appears to have had a negative interaction with foreign ownership 
on asset divestiture, though the sign was not positive. Table 6 presents results for greater than 10% 
divestiture of assets. The results were generally consistent with greater than 5% divestiture. In the case 
of 10% divestiture, however, the interaction between financial and foreign ownership was significant, 
providing stronger support of H3, that financial ownership decreased the effect of foreign ownership on 
downsizing.  
 
Ruling out alternative explanations  
Additional analyses (available from the authors) allowed us to rule out alternative explanations for the 
strong effect of foreign ownership. One alternative explanation of our results is reverse causality:  firms 
that downsized and divested assets attracted greater levels of foreign investment. If this was the case, 
we should be able to detect an increase in foreign ownership among firms that have downsized or 
divested assets.  To explore this possibility, we compared the increase in foreign ownership between 
year t and year t+2 between the entire sample and the sub-sample of firms that had downsized in the 
previous period (t-1).  There was no significant difference in the increase in foreign ownership between 
the two samples. We also estimated models in which change in foreign ownership was the dependent 
variable, and downsizing in the previous year an explanatory variable. According to these regression 
analyses, downsizing in the previous period had no effect on subsequent change in foreign ownership.  
A common causal factor may also explain the relationship between foreign ownership and 
downsizing and divestiture, if foreign investors were more likely to purchase shares in troubled firms that 
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then went on to downsize.  To examine this possibility, we compared the increase in foreign ownership 
over the subsequent two years for a sample of firms with return on assets of less than zero, with the 
whole sample. Foreign ownership was not more likely to increase among these troubled firms, indicating 
that foreigners did not have a higher propensity to buy shares of troubled firms.  
We have argued that the foreign investors were largely institutional investors. We removed from 
the sample the few cases in which a firm was controlled by a foreign corporation (there were no cases in 
which a firm was controlled by a single foreign institutional investor). Though relatively rare, there were a 
number of cases in which one of a firm’s largest investors (though not controlling investor) was a foreign 
corporation. In order to assure that the foreign shareholder effect was, indeed, due to foreign 
institutional investors, and not foreign corporations, we conducted additional analyses (available 
separately from the authors) in which we included a dummy variable that indicated whether one of a 
firm’s top ten shareholders was a foreign corporation (for a sub-sample of 700 firms). Adding this 
variable did not change the pattern of results. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 In the 1990’s, divergent business systems came into direct contact as portfolio investors 
increasingly invested in distant markets. This paper examined the interaction between the Anglo-
American market system and the stakeholder system of Japan.  We found evidence that foreign 
investors brought to Japan elements of the Anglo-American system. The greater the percentage of its 
shares held by foreign investors, the more likely a Japanese firm was to adopt practices inconsistent with 
its stakeholder system—downsizing and divestiture of assets. Foreign investors were less influential in 
firms closely tied into the existing Japanese stakeholder system, as members of corporate groups and 
firms with high levels of financial and corporate shareholding were less likely to respond to foreign 
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influence. In contrast, firms more dependent on foreign markets for their business were more susceptible 
to foreign influence.  
 The foreign shareholders in this study were largely institutional investors. Our sample omitted the 
few cases in which foreign corporations had a controlling stake. Furthermore, we found that compared 
to ownership by foreign institutional investors, ownership by foreign corporations was relatively rare. 
While purchases of Japanese firms by foreigners—for example, Renault’s de facto takeover of 
Nissan—received much publicity in the years after our sample ends, our findings suggest that the effect 
of foreign investors extends beyond such well-known cases of foreign control. It is the foreign 
institutional investors—mutual funds, pension funds, and other investment capital—that are bringing 
business systems into contact, and conflict. 
 While foreign investors were influential, their influence was conditioned on the degree to which a 
firm is integrated into the Japanese system. The more of a firm’s shares held by Japanese financial 
institutions, the less susceptible it was to influence of foreign shareholders. Ownership by financial 
institutions had a particularly strong effect on greater than 10% divestitures of assets. In this case, 
financial ownership had a negative main effect on asset divestiture, as well as decreasing the influence of 
foreigners on asset divestitures. We believe that this reflects the interests of banks. Since financial 
institutions benefit from a firm’s increasing demands for capital and transactions, they are likely to 
discourage a firm’s attempts to shrink through disposal of assets. Interestingly, financial ownership has a 
positive and significant relationship with over 10% downsizing. Other studies have suggested that one of 
the roles of the main bank in the Japanese system was to facilitate restructuring when a firm’s situation 
became desperate (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001).  In such cases, banks would do what was necessary to 
assure that a firm remained solvent and able to repay loans. The positive relationship between financial 
ownership and large downsizings is evidence that banks were playing this role.  
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Shareholding by corporations also reduced the effect of foreign ownership on downsizing. Since 
corporations provided a promise of continued sales, loan guarantees, even promises to buy shares in 
case of a takeover, firms with close relationships to other firms were better able to resist foreign 
pressure. In many cases, corporate shareholders encouraged firms to take on excess employees from 
their own companies. Equity ties provided a basis for shukko, or dispatch of employees between firms 
(Lincoln and Ahmadjian, 2000). Thus, it is likely that firms with high levels of corporate ownership 
ignored calls for downsizing, and rather, continued to accept shukko from these related companies. 
 It is puzzling that in contrast to the case of downsizing, corporate shareholders actually 
enhanced the influence of foreign shareholders for asset divestitures of greater than 5%. We found a 
possible answer to this puzzle in analyses that examined the early and later periods separately (available 
from the authors).  The relationship between corporate ownership, foreign ownership and divestiture 
reverses over time. While corporate shareholders weakened foreign pressure for divestiture during the 
early period, the relationship switches signs in the later period. In the early 1990’s, corporate owners 
did reduce foreign influence on divestiture. As the 1990’s progressed, however, divestiture of assets 
seems to have become increasingly consistent with interests of corporate owners as well. This may be 
because these corporations were increasingly subject, themselves, to foreign influence, and changed 
their own investment strategies accordingly. Furthermore, as the economic slowdown persisted through 
the 1990s, corporations also felt increasing pressure to improve the performance of their affiliates. Auto 
manufacturers, for example, increasingly placed pressure on their suppliers (whose shares they often 
held) to streamline their operations and improve efficiency (Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001). 
 Members of big six groups were less susceptible to foreign influence. Although the level of 
significance of this finding was not high, it nevertheless conforms with the pattern of results for financial 
and foreign ownership, and strengthens our conclusion that the less closely tied a firm was with the 
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Japanese system, the less susceptible it was to foreign influence. It is puzzling, however, that the main 
effect of group membership on downsizing was positive, suggesting that group members were more 
likely to downsize than others. We believe that this is the result of our rather narrow definition of group.  
Members of presidents’ councils of big six groups were at the apex of their groups, and these large and 
dominant firms were more likely to be able to exert pressure on periphery group members to accept 
their own excess employees. Thus, they may have been more likely to reduce their labor force because 
it was easier for them to do so. Our finding that group members were not more likely to divest assets 
than other firms strengthens this explanation. It was easier for group firms to downsize because they 
were surrounded by smaller firms that took on their excess employees. Since these smaller firms did not 
provide the same service for excess assets, we did not find the same relationship between group 
membership and asset divestiture. 
 While our findings for interactions between foreign ownership and financial ownership, 
corporate ownership and group membership were generally consistent, there were also some points of 
divergence, especially in the effects of financial and corporate ownership.  In general, financial 
ownership seemed to have a greater effect on asset divestiture than downsizing. Corporate ownership, 
on the other hand, seemed to have a greater influence in reducing downsizing. These patterns are merely 
impressionistic, and we are hesitant to draw firm conclusions. The fact that the effects of financial and 
corporate investors differed, however, offers intriguing evidence that “the Japanese system” was not a 
monolithic institution, but rather consisted of diverse players with diverging interests. While financial 
shareholders encouraged growth, corporate shareholders were more concerned about maintaining 
stability and employment levels. These differences merit further research, since they suggest that the 
effect of foreign shareholders and global capital depended not only on how closely a firm was linked 
with existing institutions, but, specifically, on which institutions the firm was most closely linked.  
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 Though it is difficult to identify exactly how foreigners exerted their influence, the general pattern 
of results offers some clues. First, we know from our interviews that foreign shareholders during this 
time were not active in exercising voting rights or launching proxy battles, and thus, their influence was 
not due to shareholder activism. Furthermore, our finding that financial ownership, corporate ownership, 
and group membership all diminished the influence of foreigners also suggests that foreign influence was 
not simply an excuse that firms used to elicit a sense of crisis. If foreign ownership was simply used as 
an excuse to justify restructuring, it is difficult to see why financial, corporate, and group membership 
would make restructuring less likely.  
The general pattern of findings is consistent with a resource dependence explanation of influence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to resource dependence theory, organizations are more likely 
to respond to influence of organizations on which they depend for critical resources that have few 
substitutes. Capital is such a resource, and our paper demonstrates how firms respond to the desires of 
providers of capital. As capital flows became more global, and foreign investors entered Japan, the 
resource dependencies of many firms shifted from domestic to international capital. As a consequence, 
firm behavior began to shift. A number of our results further support this resource dependence 
explanation. First, firms with a particularly strong dependence on foreign capital—exporting firms—
were more likely to respond to foreign influence. Second, firms with other sources of capital and 
support—those with financial or corporate ownership or group membership—were less dependent on 
foreigners, and thus, less likely to respond to their influence. Our finding that foreigners exerted influence 
without making overt demands is further consistent with resource dependence theory. According to this 
perspective, organizations know quite well where their dependencies lay, and respond accordingly, 
without the need for explicit demands (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
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Prospects for continued change   
Taken together, our findings indicate that the globalization of capital has had a significant and important 
effect on Japanese firm behavior, and has led Japanese firms to behave in ways more consistent with the 
Anglo-American system of capitalism, through downsizing employees and disposing of assets. 
Foreigners have had the greater influence among firms whose linkages to existing institutions are weaker, 
and whose ties to foreign markets are stronger. What do these results imply for the trajectory and 
ultimate outcome of change in Japan?  
 One possibility is that foreigners will continue to have a strong influence among firms that remain 
less closely linked to the existing set of institutions. If this is the case, there will be an increased 
bifurcation between firms that are more exposed to foreign capital and adopt more Anglo-American 
practices, and those that continue to be tied to the Japanese system and maintain business as usual. 
Other researchers have suggested this potential outcome of globalization (Walsh and Seward 1990; 
Davis and Useem 1999).  
We believe that a more likely scenario is that foreign-influenced practices will spread, as other 
firms less exposed to foreign influence increasingly imitate these practices. There are a number of 
reasons why such practices might spread beyond the foreign-influenced sectors of the corporate 
population. Other firms may observe that downsizing and divestiture of assets have favorable outcomes, 
and thus learn from the behavior of foreign-influenced firms (Haunschild and Miner 1997). Downsizing 
and divestiture may spread as a fad, as firms hop on a bandwagon of a popular business practice 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Other research on downsizing in Japan indicates that downsizing 
spread among firms in the 1990’s, moving from smaller and less prestigious firms to larger, older and 
more prestigious ones as increasing rates of downsizing removed the perceived illegitimacy of the 
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practice (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). This process is likely to continue, making downsizing and 
asset divestiture more common.  
 Foreigners may also spread the gospel of investor capitalism to other domestic investors. Our 
interviews with both investors and investor relations officials from Japanese firms suggest that this has 
occurred. Increasingly, domestic trust banks, pension funds, and insurance companies are following the 
lead of foreign investors, and becoming more cognizant of the return on their investments (Nikkei 
Weekly, 2002). Changes in accounting regulations are also likely to decrease the degree to which 
financial and corporate shareholders lessen the influence of foreigners. Until 2002, Japanese firms were 
not required to state their holdings of equity at market value, and thus, they had little incentive to care 
about performance of those companies whose shares they held. This is no longer true, and it is unlikely 
that financial and institutional shareholders could continue to suppress a firm’s tendency to downsize and 
divest assets after this regulatory change.  
 Our analyses, however, also suggest checks on spreading foreign influence. While banks are 
selling off their shares, bank holdings still remain high, and as the case of Tokyo Style mentioned 
previously suggested, banks continue to side with incumbent management against foreigners or active 
domestic investors. While we found that corporate shareholding appeared to have a declining tendency to 
weaken the effect of foreign investors on asset divestiture over time, corporate shareholding continued to 
be a check on foreign influence on downsizing. Despite unwinding of some intercorporate cross-holdings, 
corporate holdings have remained high into the 21st century. While changes in accounting standards will 
make banks and corporations less able to tolerate poor performance in their stock portfolios, remaining 
social distaste for downsizing and divestiture means that although these practices are likely to spread, 
Japanese firms are unlikely to reach downsizing and divestiture levels found in the U.S.  
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Implications for theory  
This paper has a number of implications for understanding globalization, systems of capitalisms, 
and processes of organizational change. First, it highlights the role of foreign capital as an agent of 
globalization. While much research has highlighted the improbability of a global convergence in business 
practices and economic system, the analyses in this paper offer evidence that such convergence is 
occurring as institutional investors seek returns in foreign markets. We are not willing to claim that Japan 
will become exactly like the US, and that business practices around the world are achieving uniformity. 
On the other hand, we believe that research to date may have underestimated the influences of 
globalization, especially in the power of global capital to disrupt and transform domestic systems of 
capitalism.  
Our research also offers evidence that systems of capitalism are not monolithic entities, but 
rather, sets of complementary, interlocking institutions—players with their own, sometimes divergent, set 
of interests. We saw how these interests met on the firm level, as foreign owners interacted with existing 
owners for outcomes that differed depending on the existing ownership structure of the firm. It has been 
suggested that social arenas which fall "between the worlds," in which multiple logics of action are 
possible, are the windows of opportunity for institutional change (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Our 
findings demonstrate that change is occurring in the gaps where firms are less embedded in the existing 
system of institutions. 
This paper also has implications for organization theorists beyond issues of globalization. First 
the analyses highlight the important link between ownership structure and firm behavior. While this link 
has been one of the fundamental insights offered by researchers on systems of capitalism (Aoki, 2001; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001), organizational theory has had less to say about this relationship. Our analyses 
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show that ownership patterns differ not only across economic systems, but across firms in the same 
system, and that these patterns have powerful implications for firm behavior.  
 Our results further highlight the importance of resource dependencies in determining how 
institutions affect firm behavior. Our results demonstrate that the institutions that construct a system of 
capitalism—its patterns of ownership and corporate finance system--shape a firm’s resource 
dependencies. Shifts in these resource dependencies—from debt to equity capital and from Japanese 
corporations and financial institutions to foreigners have induced shifts in firm behavior. These shifts in 
firm behavior—toward greater levels of downsizing and asset divestiture are further changing institutions 
such as the permanent employment system that comprise the Japanese business system. While neo-
institutional theory has focused on institutions as arbiters of legitimacy and cognitive constructions that 
shape conceptions of proper behavior (Scott, 1995), a long tradition in organization theory, from the 
work of Selznick (1949) to Thompson (1967) to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) treatment of coercive 
isomorphism, has also highlighted how responses to resource dependencies shape the behavior of 
organizations (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). Researchers are well advised to take these shifting resource 
dependencies into account in studies of both globalization and other instances of organizational change.  
 
Limitations and questions for further research  
Like all research, this study has a number of limitations. First, the measures of ownership are very broad, 
since finer grained data was unavailable. For example, financial owners include banks, trust banks, and 
life insurance companies. During the period studied in this paper, these different types of financial 
institutions had similar interests. Life insurance companies, for example, were primary shareholders of 
banks, and their interests to a large extent overlapped with those of banks. As the financial crisis in 
Japan progressed and deepened these interests have diverged, and it will be useful to examine the 
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effects of different types of financial institution separately.  It would also be useful to differentiate 
between the strengths of relationships between specific financial institutions and corporations and a given 
firm. For example, a corporate shareholder that is the main buyer of a supplier’s output is likely to have 
a greater influence than a corporate shareholder whose business ties are less intense. These data are 
available in hard copy, and it would be possible, though onerous, to code the identities of specific 
shareholders and evaluate their business relationships with the firm. We suspect that such finer grained 
coding of shareholders and relationships would lead to stronger levels of significance in the financial and 
corporate ownership interactions in our analyses. 
More fine-grained measures of resource dependencies would also be useful. A firm’s capital 
requirements—for example, its reliance on equity finance, and rates of investment and growth—are 
likely to affect susceptibility to influence by foreign shareholders. We predict, for example, that Toyota, 
which has been known as “Toyota Bank” for its strong cash position and propensity to fund investments 
internally, has been less influenced by foreign investors than firms that are actively accessing capital 
markets.  
The measures of asset divestiture and downsizing are also limited by data availability.  It would 
be interesting to see if firms with foreign ownership were more likely to conduct downsizing through 
layoffs, involuntary “early retirement,” or other means of labor force adjustment.  While these data are 
virtually impossible to obtain for a large sample, case studies of a limited set of companies (who were 
willing to disclose such controversial practices) might be possible.   
There may also be other paths through which US investor capitalism has influenced Japanese 
firm behavior. Firms may learn about different systems of capitalism through foreign experience of their 
senior managers, foreigners on their boards of directors, and contact with foreign companies in Japan. 
This research, however, must wait for a few more years. There are still very few foreign directors on 
 35
Japanese boards, and managers with extensive foreign experience (in particular, MBA’s) still have not 
climbed very high on the corporate ladder.  
Finally, while the question of the globalization of capital and its influence on firm behavior is 
relevant beyond Japan, our research focuses only on Japan, leaving open the question of the 
generalizability of our findings. We believe that our findings are applicable across national borders. 
Foreign institutional investors have a growing presence a number of economies that have distinct 
business systems—Korea, Germany, and France, for example—and we believe that a similar link 
between foreign investors and firm behavior will exist. More research is needed to compare the 
influence of foreign investors across economies, to examine the factors that shape this influence, and the 





Scholars have catalogued the rich diversity of systems of capitalism in industrialized economies and 
examined the processes by which divergent political systems, institutional structures, and idiosyncratic 
paths of development have led to distinct systems of employment, industrial organization, and corporate 
governance. An accelerating global economy, and a flow of investment capital across national borders is 
to some degree minimizing these differences. While it is unlikely that US investor capitalism will replace 
the Japanese or other business systems, the increasing globalization of capital assures that future 
developments will reflect encounters between divergent systems. A critical task of scholars of 
organization going forward will be to understand how these heterogeneous elements interact and 
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recombine (Stark, 1996). The developments that we examine in this paper echo a long-standing 
concern with the conditions under which institutional change is possible.  
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics 1626 firms, 1990-1997 
Variable mean 
Standard  
deviation minimum maximum 
> 5% downsizing 
 0.136  0.343  0.000  1.000  
> 10% downsizing 
 0.048  0.213  0.000  1.000  
> 5% asset divestiture 0.147  0.354  0.000  
 
1.000 
> 10% asset divestiture 0.040  0.196  0.000  
 
1.000  
Industry average downsizing rate 
 0.136  0.109  0.000  0.597  
Industry average divestiture  rate 
 0.147  0.119  0.000  0.563  
Return on assets  
(t-1) 
 0.039  0.044  -0.472  0.251  
% change in sales 
 0.030  0.117  -0.675  2.114  
1= negative profits in both year t-1 and year 
 t-2 
 0.053  0.224  0.000  1.000  
Assets (ln) t-1 
 10.941  1.367  6.836  16.008  
Number of employees (ln) t-1 
 6.918  1.173  2.833  11.308  
Wage (deviation from industry mean) t-1 
 0 1 -5.245  4.468  
Firm age in 1990 
 48.630  14.774  9.000  109.000  
Capital intensity (t-1) 
 14.233  14.936  0.382  268.975  
Exports/sales 
(t-1) 
 0.085  0.142  0.000  0.997  
Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 
 0.993  1.406  0.000  11.000  
Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 
squared 2.961  7.142  0.000  121.000  
Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 
 0.975  1.318  0.000  10.000  
Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 squared 
 2.687  6.160  0.000  100.000  
% foreign ownership (t-1) 
 0.040  0.062  0.000  0.778  
% financial ownership (t-1) 
 0.310  0.161  0.000  0.809  
% corporate ownership (t-1) 
 0.325  0.192  0.000  1.000  
Member of big six group 
 0.077 0.266 0.000  1.000  
% foreign ownership * exports/sales 
 0.005  0.020  0.000  0.512  
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% foreign ownership * % financial ownership  
 0.015  0.022  0.000  0.197  
% foreign ownership * % corporate ownership 
 0.010  0.014  0.000  0.165  
% foreign ownership * member of big six 
group 0.005  0.029  0.000  0.554 
Table 2: Bivariate correlations, 1626 firms, 1990-1997 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 > 5% downsizing 1.00       
2 > 10% downsizing 0.59 1.00      
3 > 5% asset divestiture 0.20 0.18 1.00     
4 > 10% asset divestiture 0.18 0.21 0.50 1.00    
5 Industry average downsizing rate 0.28 0.14 0.19 0.10 1.00  
6 Industry average divestiture  rate 0.13 0.11 0.35 0.16 0.50 1.00  
7 Return on assets (t-1) -0.32 -0.28 -0.27 -0.21 -0.32 -0.28 1.00 
8 % change in sales -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.08 -0.12 -0.26 0.09 
9 1= negative profits in both year t-1 and year t-2 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.14 -0.50 
10 Assets (ln) -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 0.09 
11 Number of employees (ln) t-1 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 0.11 
12 Wage (deviation from industry mean) t-1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
13 Firm age in 1990 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08 
14 Capital intensity (t-1) 0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 
15 Exports/sales (t-1) 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.19 -0.10 
16 Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 0.26 0.21 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.06 -0.34 
17 Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 squared 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.06 -0.27 
18 Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.14 0.22 0.20 -0.28 
19 Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 squared 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.15 -0.25 
20 % foreign ownership (t-1) -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.17 
21 % financial ownership (t-1) -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 
22 % corporate ownership (t-1) 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.12 
23 Member of big six group 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -.01 -.01 -.05
24 % foreign ownership * exports/sales 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.13 -0.03 
25 % foreign ownership * % financial ownership  -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.11 0.09 0.21 
26 % foreign ownership * % corporate ownership  -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.08 0.14 
27 % foreign ownership * member of big six group 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02
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  8 9 10 11 12 13 14
8 % change in sales 1.00       
9 1= negative profits in both year t-1 and year t-2 0.04 1.00      
10 Assets (ln) 0.03 -0.14 1.00     
11 Number of employees (ln) t-1 0.01 -0.14 0.87 1.00    
12 Wage (deviation from industry mean) t-1 0.00 -0.03 0.25 0.08 1.00  
13 Firm age in 1990 -0.04 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.04 1.00  
14 Capital intensity (t-1) -0.01 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.04 -0.06 1.00 
15 Exports/sales (t-1) 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.19 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
16 Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 0.00 0.28 -0.14 -0.24 0.04 0.03 0.02 
17 Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 squared -0.01 0.25 -0.12 -0.20 0.03 0.01 0.01 
18 Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 0.01 0.25 -0.30 -0.33 -0.06 -0.01 -0.19 
19 Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 squared 0.02 0.24 -0.26 -0.28 -0.05 0.00 -0.14 
20 % foreign ownership (t-1) 0.05 -0.04 0.34 0.32 0.11 -0.02 0.05 
21 % financial ownership (t-1) -0.03 -0.11 0.61 0.52 0.25 0.27 0.15 
22 % corporate ownership (t-1) 0.00 0.04 -0.28 -0.21 -0.14 -0.15 -0.05 
23 Member of big six group -.02 -.03 .45 .41 .10 .19 .15
24 % foreign ownership * exports/sales 0.03 0.07 0.22 0.19 0.05 -0.02 0.02 
25 % foreign ownership * % financial ownership  0.05 -0.08 0.50 0.46 0.16 0.07 0.09 
26 % foreign ownership * % corporate ownership  0.07 -0.08 0.24 0.25 0.01 -0.15 0.04 
27 % foreign ownership * big six 0.07 -0.00 -0.02 0.33 0.06 0.10 0.11
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  15 16 17 18 19 20 21
15 Exports/sales (t-1) 1       
16 Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 0.11 1.00      
17 Number of 5% downsizings since 1985 squared 0.11 0.89 1.00     
18 Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 0.16 0.40 0.37 1.00    
19 Number of 5% divestitures since 1985 squared 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.91 1.00  
20 % foreign ownership (t-1) 0.24 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 1.00  
21 % financial ownership (t-1) 0.09 -0.15 -0.12 -0.21 -0.18 0.17 1.00 
22 % corporate ownership (t-1) -0.12 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.29 -0.69 
23 Member of big six group .10 .03 .02 -.07 -.10 -.09 .48
24 % foreign ownership * exports/sales 0.56 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.69 0.07 
25 % foreign ownership * % financial ownership  0.24 -0.12 -0.08 -0.13 -0.10 0.84 0.45 
26 % foreign ownership * % corporate ownership  0.17 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.64 -0.08 
27 % foreign ownership * member of big six group 0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.18 0.36
 
  22 23 24 25 26 27  
22 % corporate ownership (t-1) 1.00       
23 Member of big six group -.17 1.00      
24 % foreign ownership * exports/sales -0.18 -0.17 1.00     
25 % foreign ownership * % financial ownership  -0.44 -0.34 0.53 1.00    
26 % foreign ownership * % corporate ownership  0.14 -0.39 0.35 0.47 1.00  
27 % foreign ownership *member of big six group -0.16 0.64 0.22 0.44 0.11 1.00  
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TABLE 3:  Discrete time event history analysis,  > 5% downsizing, 1626  firms, 1990-1997 













Industry average downsizing rate 
 
3.927*** 
(.329)         
3.905***   
(.329)      
3.935***   
(.329)      
3.918***     
(.329)      
 
3.948***   
(.328)      
3.954***   
(.330)      
3.916***   
(.329)  
 
3.996***   
(.329)      
Return on assets  
(t-1) 
 
-15.233***   
(1.227)     
-15.669***  
(1.237)     
-15.607***   
(1.235)     
-15.652***   
(1.245)     
-15.569***   
(1.244)     
-15.512***   
(1.248)     
-15.717***   
(1.245)   
-15.442***   
(1.252)     
% change in sales 
 
-4.062***   
(.353)     
-4.106***   
(.350)   
-4.126***   
(.350)     
-4.090***    
(.350)     
-4.083***    
(.350)     
-4.089***   
(.350)    
-4.099***  
(.351)  
    
-4.095***  
(.351)     
1= negative profits in both year t-1 and 
year t-2 
.309*   
(.126)       
.296*   
(.126)      
.300*    
(.126)       
.306**    
(.126)       
.308*   
(.126)       
.308*   
(.126)      
.304*   
(.126)    
    
.309**   
(.126)       
Number of employees (ln) (t-1) -.037   
(.028)      
-.057+   
(.029)      
-.052+   
(.029)      
-.108***   
(.036)      
-.105*  
(.036)     
-.102*   
(.037)     
-.108*    
(.036)  
    
-.095**   
(.036)      
Firm age in 1990 
 
-.009***   
(.002)      
-.009***   
(.002)    
-.009***   
(.002)      
-.010***    
(.002)      
-.010***   
(.002)      
-.011***    
(.002)      
-.010***   
(.002)   
    
-.011***   
(.002)      
Wage (deviation from industry mean) 
(t-1) 
 
-.024   
(.030)      
-.029 
 (.029)      
-.030   
(.030)      
-.042+     
(.031)      
-.042   
(.031)      
-.042   
(.031)     
-.043   
(.030)   
    
-.044+    
(.031)      
Exports/sales (t-1) 
 
-.478*   
(.221)     
-.588**   
(.222)      
-.858*** 
   (.269)      
-.616**    
(.227)      
-.594**     
(.227)      
-.604**   
(.225)      
-.634***   
(.227)  
     
-.594**   
(.229)      
Cumulative 5% downsizings,  1985 to t-
1 
 
.424***   
(.044)      
.426***   
(.043)     
.434***   
(.043)      
.412***    
(.044)       
.415***   
(.043)       
.411***   
(.044)       
.415***   
(.044) 
       
.415***   
(.044)       
Cumulative 5% downsizings, squared -.037***   
(.008)      
-.037***  
(.007)      
-.039***   
(.007)      
-.036***   
(.008)      
-.037***   
(.007)     
  -.037***   
(.007)      
-.037***   
(.007)   
    
-.038***   
(.007)      
% foreign ownership (t-1) 
 
 1.459**   
(.473)      
.813   
(.613)       
.338***     
(.505)       
2.627**     
(.890)      
2.154***   
(.644)       
1.666** 
(.534)   
     
4.175***    
(.975)       
% foreign ownership * exports/sales   3.90*  
(1.828)     
   
     
% financial ownership (t-1)    .229    .436+  .246   .201  .434    
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 (.306)        (.333)       (.306)       (.307)   
    
(.340)       
% corporate ownership (t-1)    -.071   
(.221)      
-.053   
 (.222)      
.040    
(.233)       
-.076   
 (.221)   
     
.104    
(.235)       
Member of big six corporate group    .327**   
(.116)       
.349**   
(.117)       
.314**  
 (.117)      
.466***   
(.143)  
     
.478***   
(.141)       
% foreign ownership * % financial 
ownership  
 
    -5.143*   
(3.035)      
  -5.170*   
(3.115)      
% foreign ownership * % corporate 
ownership  
 
     -5.564*   
(3.291)     
 -7.948**   
(3.182)      
% foreign ownership * member of big 
six corporate group 
      -1.988+ 
(1.286) 
-2.112*   
(1.278)  
     
Constant 
 
-1.464***   
(.236)      
-1.339***   
(.241)     
-1.345***   
(.242)    
-.989***   
(.276)      
-1.081***   
(.284)     
-1.049**   
(.281)    
-.989***   
(.276)  
    
-1.163***    
(.290) 
log likelihood (df) -4022.1*** 
(17)                             
-4017.7***                           
(18)
-4015.8***
(19)                            
-4012.8*** 
(21)                           
-4011.4 *** 
(22)                         
-4011.4***  
(22)                     
-4011.6***   
(22)                           
-4007.9*** 
(25)                            
+p<.10, p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001 (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
two tailed tests for control variables, one tailed for hypothesized effects.
 48
TABLE 4:  Discrete time event history analysis,  > 10% downsizing, 1626  firms, 1990-1997 















Industry average downsizing rate 
 
2.518***   
(.445)      
2.525***   
(.443)       
2.541551**
*   (.443)      
2.532***   
(.443)       
2.569***   
(.443)      
2.624***   
(.442)       
2.524***   
(.443)   
     
2.665***  
(.443)       
Return on assets  
(t-1) 
 
-16.228***   
(1.666)      
-16.674***   
(1.664)     
-16.639***   
(1.662)   
-16.934***   
(1.679)   
-16.888***   
(1.679)    
-16.713***   
(1.675)      
-16.934***   
(1.683)    
-16.569***   
(1.681)      
% change in sales 
 
-4.169***   
(.549)    
-4.240***   
(.540)      
-4.261***   
(.541)      
-4.216***   
(.542)      
-4.222***    
(.544)     
-4.210***   
(.541)      
-4.216***   
(.542)     
  
-4.220***    
(.543)      
1= negative profits in both year t-1 and 
year t-2 
.324+   
(.168)      
.315+   
(.169)       
.315+   
(.169)      
.326+   
(.170)       
.326+   
(.170)      
.327*   
(.169)       
.326*   
(.170) 
      
.327*   
(.169)       
Number of employees (ln) (t-1) -.091+   
(.046)    
-.118*   
(.047)      
-.114*    
(.048)      
-.235***   
(.060)      
-.232***   
(.060)     
-.224***   
(.061)     
-.235***   
(.056) 
      
-.221***  
(.061)      
Firm age in 1990 
 
-.012***   
(.004)     
-.012**   
(.004)     
-.012**   
(.004)     
-.014*** 
(.004)    
-.014***   
(.004)      
-.016***   
(.004)      
-.014***   
(.004)     
  
-.016***   
(.003)      
Wage (deviation from industry mean) 
(t-1) 
 
-.011    
(.052)      
-.026   
(.052)      
-.026    
(.052)      
-.059   
(.052)     
-.060   
(.052)     
-.056  
 (.052)      
-.059   
(.052)  
     
-.057   
(.052)      
Exports/sales (t-1) 
 
.537+   
(.322)       
.349    
(.325)       
.198   
 (.389)       
.255  
 (.332)      
.267   
 (.333)      
.313   
(.337)       
.255   
 (.337)    
    
.322   
(.342)       
Cumulative 5% downsizings,  1985 to t-
1 
 
  .398***   
(.065)       
.405***   
(.065)      
.410***   
(.066)       
.393***   
(.065)       
.396***   
(.065)      
.387***  
(.065)      
.393***   
(.066)   
     
.391***   
(.066)       
Cumulative 5% downsizings, squared -.021**   
(.009)      
-.023**   
(.009)     
-.024**   
(.009)     
-.022**   
(.009)      
-.023**   
(.009)      
  -.022**   
(.009)      
-.022**   
(.009)   
    
-.023**   
(.009)      
% foreign ownership (t-1) 
 
 2.349***    
(.726)      
1.848*   
(1.015)      
2.093** 
(.967)     
3.282*   
(1.502)      
4.050***   
(.887)       
2.09**1  
(.888)    
    
5.743***  
(1.528)       
% foreign ownership * exports/sales   2.260   
(2.929)     
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% financial ownership (t-1)    .868*    
(.509)      
1.065*   
(.548)      
.986*   
(.510)      
.869* 
(.512)      
  
1.213*  
(.559)       
% corporate ownership (t-1)    -.390   
(.356)     
-.368 
(.358)    
-.108   
(.372)     
-.390   
(.357) 
      
-.064   
(.374)      
Membership in big six corporate group    .390* 
(.187)    
   
.419*   
(.188)     
.363* 
  (.187)     
-.389 *  
(.229)      
.445*   
(.222)       
% foreign ownership * % financial 
ownership  
 
    -5.118 
(5.233)      
  -6.045   
(5.551)      
% foreign ownership * % corporate 
ownership  
 
     -16.906**   
(6.269)      
 -17.742**   
(6.062)      
% foreign ownership * membership in 
big six corporate group 
      .015 
(1.823) 
      
-.582   
(1.745)      
Constant 
 
-1.994***   
(.385)     
-1.847***   
(.388)      
-1.855***      
(.389)      
-1.049*   
(.451)     
-1.135**  
(.469)     
-1.160+   
(.456)     
-1.049 *  
(.450)    
  
-1.254**   
(.472)      
log likelihood (df) -1901.1***  
(17)                            
-1895.7***  
(18)                          
-1895.3*** 
(19)                          
-1887.5*** 
(21)                           
-1886.9***                           
(22)
-1882.7***  
(22)                           




+p<.10, p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001 (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
two tailed tests for control variables, one tailed for hypothesized effects 
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TABLE 5:  Discrete time event history analysis,  > 5% asset divestiture , 1626  firms, 1990-1997 
Variable Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Industry average divestiture rate 
 
4.500***   
(.303)      
4.473***   
(.304)      
4.472***   
(.304)      
4.475***   
(.305)      
4.495***   
(.305)      
4.456***  
(.305)      
4.474***   
(.305)     
4.478***   
(.305)     
 
Return on assets  
(t-1) 
 
-10.465***   
(1.079)      
-10.715***    
(1.103)      
-10.719***    
(1.105)      
-10.743***   
(1.106)      
  -10.647***  
(1.109)      
-10.841***   
(1.113)      
-10.761***   
(1.107)      
-10.740***   
(1.118)      
% change in sales -2.942***  
(.352)      
-2.962***   
(.353)      
-2.962***   
(.353)      
-2.967***   
(.353)      
-2.958***   
(.353)      
-2.971***   
(.353)      
-2.969***   
(.353)      
-2.963***   
(.353)      
 
1= negative profits in both year t-1 and 
year t-2 
.065    
(.126)       
.052    
(.127)       
.052   
 (.127)       
.053   
 (.127)       
.057 
 (.127)       
.052    
(.127)       
.053    
(.127)       
.056   
 (.127)      
  
assets (ln) (t-1) -.129***     
(.024)      
-.139***   
(.026)      
-.140***   
(.026)      
-.133***  
(.032)      
-.128***   
(.032)      
-.137***   
(.033)      
-.133***   
(.032)      
-.132***  
(.033)     
  
Firm age in 1990 
 
-.007***   
(.002)      
-.007***   
(.002)      
-.007***   
(.002)      
-.007***    
(.002)      
-.007**   
(.002)      
-.007***     
(.002)      
-.007***  
(.002)      
-.007***   




-.001   
(.002)      
-.001   
(.002)      
-.001   
(.002)      
-.001   
(.002)      
-.001   
(.002)      
-.001   
(.002)      
-.001    
(.002)      
-.001   
(.002)  
     
Exports/sales (t-1) 
 
.165   
 (.200)       
.108   
 (.203)       
.122  
 (.247)       
.108    
(.203)       
.135   
 (.205)       
.107   
 (.203)       
.105   
 (.203)       
.129    
(.205) 
       
Cumulative 5% divestitures,  1985 to t-1 
 
.400***  
(.045)       
.402***  
(.045)       
.401***   
(.045)       
.402***   
(.046)       
.402***   
(.046)       
.402***  
(.046)       
.401***   
(.045)       
.401***   
(.046)       
Cumulative 5% divestitures, squared -.028***   
(.009)      
-.028***   
(.009)      
-.028***    
(.009)      
-.028***   
(.009)      
-.028**   
(.009)      
-.028***   
(.009)      
-.028***   
(.009)      
-.028***   
(.009)    
  
% foreign ownership (t-1) 
 
 .788+    
(.510)       
.827+  
(.638)       
.831+   
(.524)       
2.019*   
(.957)       
.196   
 (.702)       
.943*   
(.543)       
1.402  
(1.105)   
     
% foreign ownership * exports/sales   -.205    
(2.130)    
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% financial ownership (t-1)    .067   
(.299)     
   
.246    
(.325)       
.066    
(.299)       
.058   
 (.300)       
.213   
 (.329)       
% corporate ownership (t-1)    .062    
(.204)       
.072   
 (.205)       
-.021   
(.214)      
.061   
 (.203)       
.008   
 (.217)       
Member of big six corporate group    -.123    
(.128)      
-.108   
(.129)      
-.114   
(.128)      
-.047   
(.177)      
-.079   
(.178)   
        
% foreign ownership * % financial 
ownership  
 
    -4.798+   
(3.093)      
  -4.037   
(3.187) 
% foreign ownership * % corporate 
ownership  
 
     3.869+    
(2.982)       
 2.826  
(2.996)       
% foreign ownership * member of big 
six group 
      -1.110    
(1.886)      
-.373   
(1.944)   




(.292)     
-.859***      
(.302)      
-.858**  
(.302)      
  -.977**    
(.349)      
-1.071**   
(.353)      
-.926***   
(.353)      
-.974**   
(.349)      
-1.019   
(.356)      
 
log likelihood (df) -4346.8***            
(17)                           
-4345.6***                                                     
(18)
-4345.5***
(19)                            
--4345.0***                             
(21)                   
-4343.7***                             
(22)                             
-4344.2***                          
(22)                         
-4344.8***                                                     
(22)
-4343.2***
(24)                             
+p<.10, p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001 (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
two tailed tests for control variables, one tailed for hypothesized effects 
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TABLE 6:  Discrete time event history analysis,  > 10% asset divestiture , 1626  firms, 1990-1997 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Industry average divestiture rate 
 
3.016***   
(.539)     
2.978***   
(.542)     
2.992***   
(.545)       
3.115***   
(.543)       
3.177***   
(.543)       
3.129***  
(.545)       
3.123***   
(.544)       
3.193***     
(.545)       
 
Return on assets  
(t-1) 
 
-10.545***   
(1.694)      
-10.809***   
(1.712)      
-10.786***   
(1.715)      
-10.717***   
(1.703)      
-10.582***   
(1.707)      
-10.653***   
(1.714)      
-10.740***   
(1.705)      
-10.524***   
(1.716)      
% change in sales -1.653**   
(.640)     
-1.688**    
(.642)     
-1.694**   
(.643)      
-1.725***   
(.634)      
-1.710**   
(.639)      
-1.720**   
(.635)      
-1.732**   
(.635)      
-1.709**   
(.640)      
 
1= negative profits in both year t-1 and 
year t-2 
.236    
(.189)      
.221   
 (.190)       
.221   
 (.190)       
.224   
(.189)       
.231   
 (.188)       
.224   
 (.189)       
.226    
(.189)       
.232     
(.188)  
      
Assets  (ln) (t-1) -.054   
(.045)      
-.071+   
(.046)      
-.069   
(.047)      
.030  
 (.057)       
.042    
(.058)       
.034   
 (.057)       
.031   
 (.057)       
.046   
 (.057) 
       
Firm age in 1990 
 
-.011**   
(.004)     
-.010**   
(.004)      
-.011**   
(.004)     
-.008*   
(.004)      
-.008*   
(.004)      
-.008*   
(.004)      
-.008*   
(.004)      
-.008*   
(.004)    
   
Capital intensity  
 
-.00001   
(.004)      
-.0005  
(.004)     
-.0004   
(.004)      
-.001   
(.004)      
-.0004   
(.004)      
-.0008   
(.004)      
-.0009   
(.004)      
-.0005   
(.004)    
   
Exports/sales (t-1) 
 
.355    
(.331)       
.247    
(.338)      
.169    
(.389)       
.296   
 (.331)       
.334    
(.332)       
.301    
(.334)       
.288    
(.332)       
.333   
 (.334)      
  
Cumulative 5% divestitures,  1985 to t-1 
 
.482***    
(.078)    
   
.489***   
(.079)       
.492***    
(.079)      
.486***   
(.080)       
.490***  
(.081)       
.487***   
(.080)       
.484***   
(.080)       
.490***   
(.082)       
Cumulative 5% divestitures, squared -.039**    
(.014)   
    
-.041**   
(.014)      
-.041**    
(.014)      
-.040   
(.015)      
  -.042**  
(.015)      
-.041**   
(.015)      
-.040**   
(.014)      
-.042**   
(.015)      
% foreign ownership (t-1) 
 
 422*   
(.833)      
 
1.087   
(1.305)      
1.343*   
(.811)       
3.443**   
(1.272)       
1.721*   
(.939)       
1.607*  
(.798)       
3.961**    
(1.344)       
% foreign ownership * exports/sales   1.233   
(3.027)    
    
     
% financial ownership (t-1)      -1.231**    -.863+   -1.225**   -1.256**   -.901+   
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(.522)      (.573)      (.524)      (.525)      (.586)      
 
% corporate ownership (t-1)    .017   
(.321)       
.025    
(.325)       
.070   
(.337)       
.014   
 (.321)       
.101   
(.341)       
 
Member of big six group    -.241   
(.250)      
-.199   
(.253)      
-.246   
(.250)      
.076   
 (.514)       
-.006   
(.474)    
   
% foreign ownership * % financial 
ownership  
 
    -10.500*    
(5.720)      
  -9.491+   
(6.041)      
% foreign ownership * % corporate 
ownership  
 
     -2.784   
(5.698)      
 -3.899   
(5.284)      
% foreign ownership * member of big 
six group 
      -5.065   
(8.567)      
-3.412    
(7.737)    
   
Constant 
 
-2.731**   
(.519)      
-2.568***   
(.534)      
-2.578***   
(.537)      
-3.884** 
(.619)      
-4.085***    
(.627)      
-3.916***   
(.622)      
-3.891***   
(.622)     
-4.113***   
(.624)    
  
log likelihood (df) -1858.6*** 
(17)                            
-1856.9*** 
(18)                          
-1856.8***   
(19)                         
-1851.8***                             
(21)
-1848.9***                          
(22)                            
-1851.2***
(22)                         
-1850.2***                             
(23)                           
-1848.1***
(25)                           
+p<.10, p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p< .001 (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
two tailed tests for control variables, one tailed for hypothesized effects 
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